Risk assessment concerning
“the comparability between risks of consuming beef and internal organs regulated by the beef export verification program of the United States/Canada and risks of consuming beef and internal organs of Japanese cattle”

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Food Safety Commission, Japan
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History of deliberation

May 24, 2005  Food safety risk assessment concerning “the comparability of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risks of consuming beef and internal organs imported from the United States under the control of the current U.S. domestic regulations and the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan and risks of consuming beef and internal organs of cattle slaughtered and distributed in Japan”, and “the comparability of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risks of consuming beef and internal organs imported from the Canada under the control of the current Canadian domestic regulations and the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan and risks of consuming beef and internal organs of cattle slaughtered and distributed in Japan”, was requested from the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and relevant documents were received.

May 26, 2005  The 96th Food Safety Commission (explanation of requests)

May 31, 2005  The 25th Prion Expert Committee

June 21, 2005  The 26th Prion Expert Committee

July 14, 2005  The 27th Prion Expert Committee

August 1, 2005  The 28th Prion Expert Committee

August 24, 2005  The 29th Prion Expert Committee

September 12, 2005  The 30th Prion Expert Committee

September 26, 2005  The 31st Prion Expert Committee

October 4, 2005  The 32nd Prion Expert Committee

October 24, 2005  The 33rd Prion Expert Committee

October 31, 2005  The 34th Prion Expert Committee

November 2, 2005  The 118th Food Safety Commission (report on the results of deliberation (draft))

November 2 - November 29, 2005  Public comments (Collect opinions and information)  
( The public meetings were held for an exchange of views in 7 major cities in Japan. )

December 1, 2005  The 122nd Food Safety Commission  
(Report on the summary of the public meetings)

December 8, 2005  The 123rd Food Safety Commission  
(Report on the summary of collected opinions and information)  
(Final deliberation)
Members of the Food Safety Commission

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1 Introduction

1.1 History
In accordance with the regulations of Article 24, Paragraph 3, the Food Safety Basic Law (Law No. 48, 2003), the Food Safety Commission was requested for opinions concerning the comparability of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risks of consuming beef and internal organs (hereinafter referred to as “beef and others”) imported from the United States/Canada under the control of the current U.S./Canadian domestic regulations and the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan and risks of consuming beef and others of cattle slaughtered and distributed in Japan by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) of Japan (Relevant documents were received on May 24, 2005)①, ②.

Review on the consultation by the Food Safety Commission to initiate deliberation
Review by the Food Safety Commission to initiate deliberation on the consultation has reached the following conclusions ③: The MHLW and the MAFF of Japan shall (1) fully explain the background and contents of the consultation and concepts of items for consultation in the Prion Expert Committee in the future, (2) make efforts to present additional data that are requested by the Prion Expert Committee, and (3) assume responsibility for inspecting compliance with management measures of the United States and Canada, associated with beef and others exported to Japan. On this basis, the Prion Expert Committee takes a neutral, independent position for deliberation based on scientific knowledge.

Questions in initiating a review on the consultation in the Prion Expert Committee
Relationship between the Food Safety Commission (risk assessment organization) and the risk management organization
The risk assessment organization scientifically assesses human health effects, while the risk management organization makes a comprehensive judgment based on the assessment results from the risk assessment organization and determines management measures, and it must not shift the blame to the assessment organization. Thus, the risk management organization holds its own accountability for the management measures to the people in Japan. Assessment works have been continued in the interim report ④ and in the revision of domestic BSE measures ⑤ without reconfirming the relationship between the risk assessment organization and the risk management organization. This was considered to be a cause of problems.

1.2 Background and history of the present consultation
Before the submission of the present consultation, there were some criticisms: If there is a Japan-U.S. agreement, there is no reason for the risk management organization to consult with risk assessment organization. In addition, there was a suspect that domestic BSE measures were revised based on the premise that the import ban would be lifted. The deliberation took place after the risk management organization expressed their views on these points.
Explanation and views presented by the risk management organization on the history and themes that led to the present consultation

History

1) Import ban on beef and others produced in the United States and Canada

BSE-positive cattle were discovered on May 21, 2003 in Canada and December 24, 2003 in the United States. In accordance with the Food Hygiene Law and the Domestic Animal Infectious Diseases Control Law, the MHLW and the MAFF of Japan immediately took measures to place a tentative ban on import of beef, beef products, and others. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures sets down the following provision for taking tentative measures: Efforts must be made to collect additionally required data for more objective risk assessment, and the said sanitary and phytosanitary measures should be reexamined within a reasonable period.

2) Talks to lift the import ban on beef and others produced in the United States and Canada

After BSE-positive cattle were discovered in the United States, the MHLW, the MAFF of Japan, and the head office of the Food Safety Commission (observer) immediately dispatched experts to the scene to investigate the origin of BSE-positive cattle, facts associated with breeding of cattle that shared the farm, surveillance systems, and measures such as prohibition of feeding, and published the results in January 2004. Then, Japan-U.S. working-level meetings and professional/scientific meetings of scientists and scholars of Japan and the United States were held. Based on the agreement reached in the 3rd Japan-U.S. director-general level talks concerning BSE, held on April 24, 2004, a Japan-U.S. BSE working group, including experts and professionals, was established. Seven items including BSE inspection methods and removal methods of specified risk material (SRM) were discussed three times from both technical and professional viewpoints to lift the import ban on U.S. beef, and the results were summarized in a report of expert and professional meetings concerning BSE.

3) History surrounding the Japan-U.S. and Japan-Canada talks

In September 2004, the Food Safety Commission published the “interim report” of Japanese measures against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and delivered a notice to the MHLW, and the MAFF of Japan. On October 15, 2004, both Ministries consulted the Food Safety Commission for revision of measures against BSE in Japan. Subsequently, in the 4th Japan-U.S. director-general level talks on October 23, 2004, both Japan and U.S. governments reached conclusions that they will lift the ban on bilateral beef trade based on scientific reasons under the condition of setting approval processes in each country, and that the United States sets the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan that lays down (1) SRM removal in cattle of all ages and (2) issuing of certificates of beef and others derived from cattle aged 20 months or younger (individual or herd age certificates or age certificates by grading carcasses) to lift the ban on U.S. beef export to Japan. Further, they agreed that approval processes of each country should be set, including deliberation by the Food Safety Commission. The import conditions confined to beef and others derived from cattle aged 20 months or younger was set based on the contents of the aforementioned revision of domestic measures, submitted to the Food Safety Commission, taking into account the Japanese assertion about the necessity to conduct BSE inspection from food-safety
viewpoints, besides SRM removal in cattle of all ages. After the talks, Japan and the United States continued to hold working-level talks about the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan. Meanwhile, the deliberation by the Food Safety Commission regarding the revision of domestic measures, commenced on October 26, 2004, and responses from the Food Safety Commission were delivered to both Ministries in May 2005 \(^5\). Following this occasion, the present consultation began on May 24 \(^1\).

In Canada, BSE-positive cattle were discovered on May 21, 2003. Data of the field survey, generation status, and countermeasures were collected, and the results were published in July 2003 \(^15\). Talks with the Canadian government continued, and in November 2004, Japan and Canada held working-level talks on the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan \(^16\) that lays down (1) SRM removal in cattle of all ages, (2) issuing of certificates of beef and others derived from cattle aged 20 months or younger (individual or herd age certificates). The premise of this Program was a domestic approval process that includes deliberation in the Food Safety Commission concerning lifting the ban on Canadian beef import. The talks led to the present consultation on May 24 \(^2\).

**Purpose of the consultation**

The MHLW and the MAFF of Japan explain the purpose of the consultation as follows \(^17\):

1) **Attitudes toward the revision of the domestic measures**

Food safety regulations, both domestic and import measures, have been implemented based on securing scientific rationality. According to the Food Safety Basic Law, except in emergency cases, a food safety risk assessment must be conducted based on the latest scientific knowledge to lay down measures \(^18\). Domestic BSE measures were urgently laid down in October 2001, considering the situation, where age of cattle, as well as international standards, standards of the European Commission (EC), and expert opinions of that time, could not necessarily be confirmed and the public felt strong anxiety. Thus, assessment of the measures had been the issue. In September 2004, after the Food Safety Commission summarized the results of the assessment and inspection of the domestic measures, revision of the domestic measures was submitted in October 2004 \(^13\), and the MHLW and the MAFF of Japan made an arrangement for a risk management organization based on the verdict in May 2005 \(^5\).

2) **Attitudes toward the consultation**

The risk assessment associated with lifting the ban on import of the U.S./Canadian beef and others should be based on the latest scientific knowledge concerning the comparability between risks of consuming beef and others that were imported under certain conditions laid down in Japan-U.S. talks and risks of consuming beef and others produced in Japan, since the ban on the import at that time was a tentative one associated with BSE occurrence in both countries. It was difficult to confirm the comparability of the safety of U.S. beef and others with the safety of Japanese beef and others merely with the U.S. domestic measures, thus, after discussion from technical and professional viewpoints in the Japan-U.S. talks, the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan \(^19\) was set as an additional measure, which lays down (1) SRM removal in cattle of all ages, and (2) issuing of age certificates of individual animals or herd based on the product records or by grading carcasses for beef and others derived from animals aged 20 months.
or younger. Canadian beef and others were also considered in the same manner.²⁰

3) Attitudes toward the risk management measures
If the import ban is lifted, the MHLW and the MAFF of Japan will conduct on-site inspections to confirm the effectiveness of the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan. After receiving the verdict of the consultation from the Food Safety Commission, the MHLW and the MAFF of Japan will determine whether or not to lift the import ban on the U.S./Canadian beef, and fulfill the accountability for the contents through risk communication and others.

1.3 Fundamental policy on the deliberation
To assess the comparability between health risks derived from beef and others imported under the Beef Export Verification Program of the United States/Canada for Japan and risks of consuming foods derived from beef and others of cattle slaughtered in Japan, differences between the assessment items of U.S./Canada and Japan (risks of live cattle and beef), used in the consultation for the revision of Japanese BSE measures, were fundamentally examined and comprehensively assessed (Fig. 1). The main items included (1) risks of live cattle: comparison of the external challenge, internal challenges (degree of exposure and propagation), and inspection and surveillance, and (2) risks of beef and others: comparison of slaughtered cattle, each slaughtering process, and risks of meat and others. Specific figures were used for the assessment, wherever possible, for comparative analysis between the data of Japan and U.S./Canada; however, quantitative assessment was considered difficult due to many unclear points that may arise and insufficient available data, and thus investigation was conducted based on qualitative assessment with a pessimistic scenario.
Fig. 1 Summary of Risk assessment model used in this report

2. Risk assessment - Live cattle (infection rate and cumulative level of BSE prion)

BSE contamination status of live cattle in the United States is assessed in absolute numbers, but to consider the BSE contamination rate, the differences in the herd sizes (farmed cattle: approximately 4.5 million in Japan, 95 million in the United States (approximately 20 times); cattle slaughtered annually: approximately 1.3 million in Japan, 35 million in the United States (approximately 30 times)) must also be considered 21).

In Canada, BSE contamination status is also assessed in absolute numbers, but to consider the BSE contamination rate, the differences in the herd sizes (farmed cattle: approximately 15 million (approximately 3 times larger than that of Japan), including approximately 8 million beef cattle, 1.6 million dairy caws, and 5 million calves; cattle slaughtered annually: approximately 4.5 million (approximately 3 times larger than that of Japan)) must also be considered 21).

2.1 Comparison of external challenges

Import of live cattle

In 1989, the United States banned the import of ruminants from Britain and other countries where BSE occurred 22). In 1997, the import of live cattle from Europe was also banned 22). In terms of the import
of live cattle from high-risk countries for BSE during a period of the 1980s to the 1990s, the United States imported 323 to 327 live cattle (the difference between the two statistics was represented in range) from Britain \(^{23}\). Among them, all 117 live cattle tested negative for BSE and were disposed of \(^{23}\), and they are not regarded as a risk factor. Thus, the risk factor of the live cattle imported from Britain is considered to range from 206 to 210 \([(323-117) to (327-117) animals: 1980 to 2003]\). In addition, the United States imported 563 to 1,762 heads of cattle from European countries other than Britain \(^{23}\). Among them, 66 or 51 (Each value depends on different statistics: animals that did not enter the rendering system as a result of a retrospective investigation, and cattle imported during the period that is not included as a risk factor) were not considered as a risk factor \(^{23}\). Therefore, the risk factor of the live cattle imported from European countries other than Britain is considered to range from 497 to 1,711 \([(563-66) to (1,762-51) animals: 1980 to 2003]\).

Also, approximately 0.16 to 0.6 million heads of cattle and 1 million were imported annually from Canada in the 1980s (1986 to 1989) and 1990s, respectively \(^{23}\). Between 1990 and 2003, 0 to 242 heads of cattle (the difference between the two statistics was represented in range) were imported from Japan \(^{23}\). Assuming that the contamination rate of European countries other than Britain is 100-fold lower than that of Britain at that time \(^{24}\), the United States imported 206 to 210 live cattle from Britain and approximately 5 to 17 live cattle (497/100 to 1,711/100), a reduced value to the cattle of Britain, from European countries other than Britain.

Meanwhile, Japan imported 33 and 16 dairy cows from Britain and Germany, respectively \(^{25}\) [The dairy cows imported from Germany are 0.16, a reduced value to the cows of Britain (16/100)].

Since it is unlikely that the external challenge in Canada and Japan influenced the contamination in the United States they are not considered at present, and thus the risk in the United States is approximately 211 to 227 heads of cattle \([(206+5) to (210+17)]\). According to the pessimistic scenario, the contamination rate is estimated to be approximately 6 to 7 times \([(211/33) to (227/33)]\) higher than that of Japan. The optimistic scenario is that, considering that 96% of imported cattle of the United States are beef cattle unlike those of Japan \(^{23}\), and that dairy cows are BSE-positive at approximately 4-fold higher rate than beef cattle due to differences in feeding such as starter in Britain at that time \(^{26}, 27\), the actual risk is estimated to be approximately 1.5 to 1.8 times \([6 to 7)/4\] higher than that of Japan (Thirty-three animals (all dairy cows) were imported from Britain at that time.). Based on the above assumptions, the risk of imported live cattle is estimated to be approximately 1.5 to 7 times higher than that of Japan.

In 1990, Canada banned the import of live cattle from Britain and Ireland \(^{22}\). In addition, the import of live cattle from countries where BSE occurred was banned in 1994, and the import of live cattle from countries other than BSE-free countries was banned in 1996 \(^{22}\). Between 1980 and 2003, Canada
imported 231 to 698 live cattle (the difference between the two statistics was represented in range) from Britain. Among them, the import of 500 heads of cattle (cattle used in either statistics) that were considered to be imported in 1993 was highly suspected as a result of a detailed investigation, thus they are not regarded as a risk factor. A retrospective investigation on the 231 animals imported between 1980 and 1990, indicated that possibly 117 animals have entered the rendering system, but the remaining 114 were not regarded as a risk factor. Thus, the risk of the live cattle imported from Britain is considered to range from 117 to 198 heads [(231-114) to (698-500) heads: 1980 to 2003].

Canada imported 308 to 324 heads of cattle from European countries other than Britain. Among them, 58 and 33 (each value depends on different statistics: animals excluded from the rendering system, and those imported during the period that was considered risk-free) were not regarded as a risk factor. Thus, the risk of the live cattle imported from European countries other than Britain is considered to range from 250 to 291 heads [(308-58) to (324-33) heads: 1980 to 2003]. Canada also imported approximately 16,000 to 340,000 heads of cattle annually from the United States.

Assuming that the contamination rate of European countries other than Britain is 100-fold lower than that of Britain at that time, Canada imported 117 to 198 live cattle from Britain and approximately 3 live animals (250/100 to 291/100), a reduced value to cattle of Britain, from European countries other than Britain. The external challenge of live cattle in Canada is approximately 120 to 201 heads (117 + 3 to 198 + 3). Since the external challenge in the United States was unlikely to influence the contamination in Canada it is not considered at present. Based on the above assumptions, the external challenge in Canada is estimated to be approximately 4 to 6 times ((120/33) to (201/33)) higher than that of Japan.

**Import of meat-and-bone meal**

In 1989, the United States banned the import of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) from Britain and other countries where BSE occurred. In 1997, the import of MBM of ruminants from European countries was banned, and in 2000, the import of processed protein of all kinds of animals from European countries was also banned. The United States imported 5 to 140t of MBM from Britain (1980 to 2003). Among them, 39t imported in 1989 (unconfirmed by the British export statistics) and 77t imported between 1997 and 1999 (derived from non-mammals) were not considered as the object of risk. Thus, the risk of the MBM imported from Britain is estimated to be 5 to 24t [140-(39+77)]. The United States imported 684 to 2,129t from European countries other than Britain (1980 to 2003). In addition, 227,572 to 405,863t was imported from Canada.

Meanwhile, although Japan did not import MBM from Britain (except import between 1995 and 2000 of approximately 9,000t of bone meal and others that underwent high-temperature and high-pressure processing), approximately 56,000t was imported from Italy between 1987 and 2001, and approximately 31,000t (heat-treated) was imported from Denmark between 1999 and 2001.
Assuming that the contamination rate of European countries is 100-fold lower than that of Britain at that time, the United States imported approximately 12 to 45t from Britain \([684 \text{ to } 2,129)/100+ (5 \text{ to } 24)]\), and Japan imported approximately 560t (approximately 56,000/100); thus, the risk of the United States is estimated to be approximately 12 to 47-fold lower than that of Japan.

In 1988, Canada banned the import of MBM from countries other than the United States \(^{22}\). In 1990, the import ban of MBM was lifted for BSE-free countries, and in 2000, the import of processed proteins of all kinds of animals from countries other than BSE-free countries was banned \(^{22}\).

Between 1980 and 2003, Canada imported 0 to 149t of MBM (the difference between the two statistics was represented in range) from Britain \(^{28}\). However, all the 149t is MBM of non-mammals \(^{28}\) and is not regarded as a risk factor. Since the import of MBM from Britain is 0t, its external challenge is negligible.

In addition, 5,710 to 11,046t of MBM (the difference between the two statistics was represented in range) was imported from European countries other than Britain, of which 5,699 to 11,046t (except 0 to 11t imported from Ireland) was derived from non-ruminants \(^{28}\) and thereby was not considered. Thus, the external challenge of MBM imported from European countries other than Britain is estimated to be 0 to 11t \([(5,710-5,699) \text{ to } (11,046-11,046)]\). Besides, 0 to 26t and approximately 250,000 to 310,000t of MBM were imported annually from Japan and the United States, respectively \(^{28}\). Since the contamination in Japan and the United States was unlikely to have profound effects on the contamination in Canada, they are not considered at this time.

Assuming that the contamination rate of European countries was 100-fold lower than that of Britain at that time, Canada imported approximately 0 to 0.11t \((0/100 \text{ to } 11/100)\), a reduced value to MBM in Britain. Thus, the external challenge of MBM in Canada is approximately 5,100-fold lower than that of Japan (560t, a reduced value to MBM in Britain).

**Import of animal oil and fat**
Japan imported 1,245t of animal oil and fat from the Netherlands in the 1990s \(^{25}\).

There is no actual import of animal oil and fat from the Netherlands by the United States \(^{29}\). The import from other European countries before 1994 is unknown \(^{29}\). Since 1995, most animal oil and fat were imported from Canada, and import from other European countries amounted to approximately 643t \(^{29}\). In addition, approximately 3,000t and 2,000t were imported in 1999 and 2001 from Argentine (GBR assessment: level 1), respectively, and a small proportion was imported from Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, and China \(^{29}\). Since the animal fat and oil from Canada was unlikely to influence the external challenge of the United States they are not considered at present.

There is no actual import of animal oil and fat from the Netherlands by Canada \(^{29}\). The import from
other European countries before 1994 is unknown. Since 1995, most animal oil and fat were imported from the United States, and import from other European countries amounted to less than 100t. Since the animal fat and oil from the United States was unlikely to have profound effects on the external challenge of Canada they are not considered at present.

Thus, the risks derived from the animal fat and oil in the United States and Canada are approximately 2-fold and 12-fold lower than that of Japan, respectively.

**Comparison of external challenges in the United States/Canada and Japan**

The major European countries imported several thousand live cattle from Britain (Ireland: approximately 33,000, Germany: approximately 6,500, Portugal: approximately 10,000, and France/Netherlands: 3,000 to 5,000) and several thousands tons of MBM from Britain (France/Netherlands: 25,000t, Belgium: 12,000t, Ireland: 7,200t, Italy: 4,200t, and Germany: 1,200t). BSE external challenge in the United States, Canada, and Japan are <10 to 100-fold lower than those of the above-mentioned European major countries. When the risks of imported live cattle are selectively assessed, the United States and Canada are approximately 1.5 to 7-fold and 4 to 6-fold more intensely contaminated than Japan, respectively, and in terms of the contamination of MBM, the United States and Canada are approximately <12 to 47-fold and <5,100-fold less intensely contaminated than Japan, respectively, and in terms of the risks of animal fat and oil, the United States and Canada are approximately 2-fold and <12-fold less intensely contaminated than Japan, respectively. Thus, the overall external challenge in the United States and Canada are considered comparable with those in Japan. When the risks of imported live cattle are selectively assessed considering the improper feed regulations, the contamination caused by the external challenge in the United States and Canada are estimated to be approximately <1.5 to 7-fold and <4 to 6-fold higher than that of Japan.

**2.2 Comparison of internal challenges**

**Animal feed regulations**

The risks associated with domestic BSE propagation differ between dairy cows, for which milk substitute and starter are used, and pastured beef cattle. Approximately 80% and 90% of domestic cattle are destined for beef in the United States and Canada, respectively, while approximately 60% of domestic cattle in Japan are reared as such. The potential effects of these structural differences in farming on domestic exposure and amplification must be taken into consideration. However, the critical risk factors in internal challenge are associated with use of SRM, feed regulations, and the compliance of the regulations.

In August 1997, the United States banned feeding of proteins derived from mammals to ruminants by law. The feed regulations included (1) a ban on use of proteins derived from mammals, except for certain kinds of proteins (e.g., blood), in feed materials for ruminants, (2) mandatory labeling such as “No feeding to ruminants” when banned materials are used as feed materials, (3) mandatory record retention of feeding and feed production, and (4) mandatory separation of equipment and facilities, and
mandatory cleaning of manufacturing processing equipment for prevention of cross-contamination. However, neither feeding of proteins derived from ruminants to pigs and chickens was banned or feeding of poultry residual dross, poultry manure, and garbage to cattle was banned.

In the United States, BSE-positive cows were discovered in December 2003 and public comment was called for in January and July 2004, concerning the regulations of use of bovine blood/blood products and garbage 31), and concerning exclusion of SRM from animal feed materials and downer and dead animals and reinforcement of preventive measures against cross-contamination such as specified feed production facilities for ruminants 32), respectively, but these regulations have not been implemented as of 2005. Thus, cross-contamination is not considered to be completely prevented in the United States even today. On October 4, 2005, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published a draft revision of feed regulations as safety measures against BSE 33). This draft revision banned use of high-risk regions that may mediate BSE in foods and feedstuff for all animals. The banned high-risk regions included (1) brains and spinal cords of cattle aged 30 months or older, (2) brains and spinal cords of cattle of all ages that are unexamined or unfit for human consumption, (3) entire carcass of a bovine animal that is unexamined or unfit for human consumption in case where its brain and spinal cord is not removed, (4) animal fat and oil containing ≥0.15% insoluble impurities derived from regions banned by the present regulations, and (5) mechanically recovered meat derived from regions banned by the present regulations.

In August 1997, Canada banned feeding ruminant-derived proteins to ruminants by law 34). As in the United States, the feed regulations included (1) a ban on use of proteins derived from mammals, except certain kinds of proteins, in feed materials for ruminants, (2) mandatory labeling such as “No feeding to ruminants” when banned materials are used as feed materials, and (3) mandatory record retention of feeding and feed production. To protect Canadian cattle from cross-contamination, public comment concerning SRM exclusion in manure and feedstuff, including pet food, was called for in December 2004 35) 36), but these regulations have not been implemented yet as of October 2005.

In Japan, the MAFF issued a notice in April 1996 that ruminant-derived MBM should not be used as feedstuff for ruminants 37), but no preventive measures against cross-contamination were taken. After BSE-positive animal was confirmed in September 2001, use of all mammal-derived proteins in feedstuff was banned by law in October (prevention of cross-contamination) 38). In April 2005, after preventive measures against cross-contamination were completely established in both hardware and software, the regulations that banned the use of pig-derived proteins in feedstuff for pigs and chickens were lifted 39).

While Japan issued a notice on feed regulations in April 1996, the United States and Canada enforced the law on feed regulations in August 1997. In Japan, complete feed regulations to prevent cross-contamination have been enacted into law since October 2001, but not in the United States and Canada. According to the European model used in the revision of domestic regulations, the risk-reduction effect of the feed regulations, excluding prevention of cross-contamination, is expected to reduce the BSE contamination rate to 0.26 to 0.6 in 3 years 40-42). Thus, domestic exposure in the United States, Canada,
and Japan is considered to have increased since the 1990s, reaching the maximum level to cattle born before the regulations were implemented, and gradually decreased to cattle born after the implementation (Based on the European data, the domestic exposure to cattle born in 2004 is expected to be reduced to approximately 1/4 \([0.1 \text{ to } 0.36 = (0.29 \text{ to } 0.6) \times (0.29 \text{ to } 0.6)}\) of the maximum level). It is expected that in Japan, where the complete feed regulations were enacted into law, the contamination rate in cattle born after 2002 will decline rapidly; however, the reduction rate has not changed in the United States and Canada even today. At present, the contamination rate of cattle aged 20 months or younger and which are born after 2004 is estimated to be a little bit higher (1.5-fold) in the United States and Canada than in Japan.

**Compliance status and potential cross-contamination**

In terms of feed mills in the United States, separation of equipment and facilities and cleaning of manufacturing processing equipment were made compulsory in 1997 (mandatory documentation and proposal of cleaning process at the time of examination)\(^{30}\). However, it is difficult to completely eliminate contaminants by routine cleaning. As of May 2005, 80% of rendering facilities (205/255) and 99% of feed mills (6,121/6,199) became specialized facilities (facilities that deal with either banned materials or non-banned materials)\(^{43}\). The compliance with the feed regulations in feed mills in the United States is inspected by examining officers of the FDA and others according to the guideline, and the results are published\(^{44}\). In addition, the General Accounting Office (GAO) regularly inspects the compliance with feed regulations, and makes recommendations on points that need improvement\(^{45}\). According to these reports, the compliance rate before 1998 was 30 to 70%\(^{46}\). The compliance rate was as low as 50 to 58% when the law was enforced in 1997, but most noncompliances were minor, simply associated with documentation, and not critical such as the use of banned materials\(^{47}\). According to the investigation conducted in June 2005, the compliance rate was approximately 97%\(^{48}\). As for cross-contamination risks, distribution after manufacturing in feed mills and feed mixing in farmhouses are also critical factors. According to the FDA report in June 2005, among 12,575 factories and others (the number of operating factories according to the FDA survey), there are 3,288 factories that deal with regulated products, including 8 factories that need regulatory intervention, and 90 factories that do not need regulatory intervention but need instructions for improvement; thus, the compliance rates of feed regulations associated with feed mixing in farmhouses, wholesaling, retailing, transportation, and others was 97.1%\(^{48}\). Since feeding of poultry residual dross, poultry manure, and garbage to cattle is not prohibited, there remain potential cross-contamination risks. The GAO report on February 25, 2005 states, “the FDA feed regulations have been improved. But its effectiveness is limited, thus cattle in the United States are continuously exposed to BSE epidemic risks.”\(^{45}\).

In Canada, the compliance with the feed regulations is inspected by examining officers of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in accordance with the program. After two BSE-positive cows were discovered in Canada in January 2005, the Canadian Government inspected the effectiveness of the feed regulations that had been implemented since 1997 based on the inspection results of the CFIA. Consequently, the Government announced that the regulations were virtually observed in more than
90% of feed mills and rendering factories 49). Specialization of feed and rendering industrial facilities by species is under progress, and 79% of rendering facilities (23/29) and 83% of feed mills (456/550) are specialized as of May 2005 43). As for mixed feed, a tendency is observed for mixing farmhouses to produce the feed by species 50).

The compliance rate of feed regulations in Japan at the time of the notification (April 1996) 37) was almost comparable with that of the United States. According to the results of the on-site inspection on all farmhouses in September 2001, 165 farmhouses (5,129 heads of cattle) were reported to have fed MBM prepared by in-house mixing and others 51). However, a ban on use 38) and import 52) of MBM and incineration of SRMs at slaughterhouses (except for the vertebral column) 53) have been enacted into law since October 2001. In the inspection of 1,274 cases in 665 manufacturers, concerning the compliance with prevention of cross-contamination and separation of production process lines, there were 3 cases of violation 54). Separation of feed production lines between pigs/chickens and cattle, and separation of their facilities were completed at the end of March 2005 54). The potential cross-contamination in Japanese cattle (born before 2002), born before the compliance with the complete feed regulations, cannot be denied, but the risk of feedstuff is considered extremely low as of January 2004.

Under the present feed regulations, the possibility remains that the cross-contamination in the United States and Canada occurs at a certain rate in the future.

Use of specified risk materials (SRMs) (rendering)

Specified risk materials (SRMs) are considered to account for 99.4% of the infectivity of BSE-positive cattle 55). Thus, whether SRMs are disposed of after incineration or used as feedstuff after rendering is the most critical point in assessing the exposure and propagation risk of domestic cattle. In Japan, SRMs are removed from slaughtered cattle of all ages, and are incinerated 53). Also, bovine MBMs derived from regions other than SRMs are incinerated 56). On the other hand, in the United States and Canada, SRMs of cattle aged 30 months or older are not used for food 57), but the removed SRMs are used as feedstuff for pigs and chickens after rendering 58). Same is the case for SRMs derived from animals died in farms, animals that are not used for food in slaughterhouses (downers and abnormal animals), and all healthy animals aged 30 months or younger. In this sense, SRMs derived from all the cattle are used for feedstuff. A ban on use of SRMs for feedstuff was strongly warned by the International Inspection Team in January 2004 59).

As described above, the FDA published a draft revision of the feed regulations that banned use of high-risk materials in food and feedstuff for all animals on October 4, 2005 33).

Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy (TME)

In the United States and Canada, occurrence of transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) has been confirmed as TSE (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy) other than BSE. Scrapie infection via
sheep given as feed has been considered to be the cause. Some argue that downer cattle that were given as feed cause TME in the United States. However, considering that TME occurrence is rare in the United States, and that in the farms where TME occurred in 1985 no TME had occurred in spite of feeding of beef internal organs of diseased and slaughtered cattle in the past decades, even if there were animals that might be the cause of TME at that time, the number is considered extremely small (60). Furthermore, since feeding of mink-derived proteins to cattle was prohibited in 1997 (30), TME is considered to pose little risk to cattle and other ruminants (61).

Based on the above findings, the risk of TME in cattle born after February 2004 in the United States and Canada is considered extremely low at present.

**Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD)**

In 1967, spongiform encephalopathy in mules was discovered in Fort Collins, Colorado, U.S. where mule deers and red deers were in the pasture or in captivity. Besides mules, it is infectious to red deers, elks, and Rocky Mountain elks. Up to present, the occurrence has been reported in Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wyoming, New Mexico, Wisconsin, and Illinois in the United States, and Saskatchewan (1996) and Alberta in Canada (60). The CWD incidence rate in captured elks is reported to be <1% to 71% (other reports suggest approximately <1% to 17% in mule deers and white-tailed deers and <1% in elks) (62).

At present, there is no evidence of involvement of CWD in BSE infection in the United States and Canada (63). However, considering the fact that CWD is actively studied mainly in the United States at present, we have not reached the stage of drawing a conclusion on whether or not CWD may be a cause of BSE. Nevertheless, rendering facilities of ruminant feedstuff have prohibited the acceptance of corpses of deers and elks since 1997 in the United States and Canada (30) (34).

**Scenario model of BSE exposure and amplification (internal challenge)**

According to the risk assessment conducted by the EU Scientific Steering Committee, the infectivity titer of one BSE-infected adult bovine animal is estimated to be 8,000 ID\(_{50}\) (ID\(_{50}\): median infection dose) (55), and specified risk materials are considered to account for 99.4% of it (55). Based on this assumption, when SRMs are not disposed of, almost all the infectivity titer would enter rendering, no matter how one BSE-positive animal might be slaughtered (P=1, Assuming that the infectivity titer is approximately 10,000 ID\(_{50}\), the following is considered.). Assuming that the infectivity titer is reduced to approximately 1/100 by 20 minutes of rendering treatment at 133 °C and 3 atm, according to the OIE standard (64), the infectivity titer of MBM and others (including animal fat and oil) per animal is estimated to be approximately 100 ID\(_{50}\). It is difficult to estimate each probability of cross-contamination in rendering facilities as well as during the feed production process, transportation/distribution, and mixing in farmhouses, but assuming that these amount to 10%, the probability after cross-contamination is P=0.1 (1/10).
Assuming that 10% of MBM that enters rendering is consumed by pigs and chickens and returns to cattle via cross-contamination or poultry residual dross, poultry manure, and garbage, the infection dose is approximately 10 ID₅₀.

If 100 heads of BSE-positive cattle are slaughtered annually, they enter rendering 100 times at P=1; assuming that the frequency of cross-contamination is 1/10 in a year, infection might occur 10 times a year (100/10) with the total infection dose of approximately 100 ID₅₀ (10 ID₅₀ x 10 times). According to this scenario, the infection scale is in a static state. When the regulations reduce the probability of cross-contamination or a cross-contamination dose below this level, infection is also reduced. When this level is not achieved, infection spreads. When the probability of infection is reduced, the epidemic pattern is predicted to change into a discontinuous one in the long term such as 10 times/year, 5 times/year, and furthermore, to 1 time/year, 1 time/2 years, and 1 time/5 years (Figure 2).

**Fig.2 Schematic representation of epidemic Pattern of Cross-Contamination (Image)**

When discontinuous, nonuniform, and sporadic epidemic occurs, and the product of contamination frequency (%) and contamination dose (%) is 100, the epidemic is repeated after an average incubation period without change of the epidemic scale. Reduction of contamination dose and contamination frequency diminishes the epidemic scale.
2.3 Verification by surveillance

Verification and comparison of subjects and the testing techniques

Surveillance in the United States

BSE inspection in the United States has been aimed at surveillance, and histopathological tests have been conducted since May 1990 on cattle aged 24 months or older and with central nervous system manifestation or abasia \(^{46}\). The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) have introduced an immunohistochemical (IHC) method since 1993 \(^{65}\) \(^{66}\). The number of tested cattle between 1990 and 2001 was 16,829 \(^{67}\). The number of subject cattle have increased since 2002 to approximately 20,000 high-risk cattle annually, and 57,654 heads of cattle were inspected using histopathological tests and the IHC method between 2002 and May 31, 2004 \(^{67}\). As a result, the first BSE case in the United States was discovered in December 2003. The subsequent epidemiological study reported that this cow was not born in the United States but was imported from Canada \(^{68}\). After this incidence, according to the advice of the international inspection team, an expanded surveillance began since June 2004 \(^{69}\). In this expanded surveillance, ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) was used in primary test, and the IHC method was used in confirmatory test as before. The number of inspected cattle amount to 383,477 as of July 3, 2005 \(^{70}\). Among them, the second BSE case in the United States was detected in June 2005 \(^{71}\) .
### Table 1. Surveillance in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle strongly suspected of BSE and/or cattle with central nervous system manifestation</th>
<th>Downer cattle</th>
<th>Dead cattle</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 (Until May 31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004-July 3, 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Breakdown between 1990 and 1993 is unknown (reference data for the consultation in the United States (29))

In the expanded surveillance, a commercial Plateria kit is introduced for the ELISA method (primary test) \(^{72}\), and is used in a total of 13 institutes including the NVSL and 12 voluntarily participating State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories (SVDL) \(^{73}\). The ELISA method was conducted on 369,467 heads of cattle by May 29, 2005, of which three were tested inconclusive \(^{74}\), but were tested negative by the IHC method, which was conducted as the confirmatory test.

In June 2005, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) demanded confirmatory tests of these three by the Western Blot (WB method). The above diagnosis institutes lacked both a facility and experience of the WB method, thus the National Animal Disease Center (NADC) performed the test, and one was revealed positive. This sample was also tested positive by both the WB and IHC methods at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) in Britain. In the United States, the IHC method was performed again using a different antibody, and a positive result was obtained at this time \(^{71}\) \(^{75}\). The ELISA had not been conducted before the expanded surveillance in June 2004, neither had the WB method before May 2005. Thus, unlike the young cattle and atypical cases detected by the ELISA and WB method in Japan (tested negative by the IHC method), undetectable BSE cases might have been overlooked by the IHC method in the United States. As a result, the WB method described in the OIE Manual of Standards has been added to the confirmatory test since June 2005 \(^{76}\), however, no official document on details about the WB
method that will be introduced in the United States has been presented to the Prion Expert Committee to date.

Thus, the surveillance in the United States might have detected more BSE cattle than reported.

Surveillance in Canada
Canada initiated a surveillance program in 1992. The aim was to identify the presence of BSE in Canada. Several thousands of cattle with central nervous system manifestation or abasia were examined between 1992 and 2003. In 1993, BSE infection was confirmed in one cow imported from Britain, and the cow was disposed of without being used in food or feed. At that time, all the cattle imported from Britain was disposed of, and a BSE testing by IHC method took place, but all the cattle were tested negative. After the discovery of a BSE cow in May 2003 (the first case in Canada), the aim of the surveillance shifted to the assessment of BSE prevalence in adult cattle, and the expanded surveillance began after the ELISA was introduced in January 2004. In 2004, 23,550 heads of cattle were inspected, and 30,000 are scheduled for inspection annually after 2005 (20,949 were inspected between January 2005 and April 18, 2005). As a result of the initiative, the second case in Canada was discovered on January 2, 2005, and the third case on January 11, 2005.

Histopathological tests and the IHC method have been introduced to the BSE surveillance in Canada since 1992 and 1994, respectively. After the discovery of the first case in Canada, the WB method was introduced in September 2003, and the ELISA in 2004. Currently, a simple WB method and the ELISA are performed at state veterinary pathology laboratory, which belong to the TSE inspection organization network, and 6 CFIA network facilities. Positive samples are then sent to the BSE Reference Laboratory in the National Centre for Foreign Animal Diseases (NCFAD) for confirmatory test by the IHC method. However, the WB method is used when the brain stem (obex) cannot be identified anatomically due to sample conditions, or when conflicting results are obtained by a rapid test and the IHC test.
Table 2. BSE Surveillance in Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Downer cattle(^1)</th>
<th>Dead cattle</th>
<th>Others(^2)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Cattle that were slaughtered in an emergency or exhibited abnormalities in the antemortem inspection in slaughterhouses are included.

2) Cattle that were farmed with BSE cattle and thus were disposed of, healthy cattle, and others are included.

3) Breakdown between 1994 and 2001 is unknown (reference data for the consultation in Canada (28))

Reference: Reference data for the consultation in Canada (28); Supplementary document associated with food safety risk assessment (submitted on June 10, 2005)

Surveillance in Japan

In Japan, surveillance by histopathological tests of cattle with central nervous system manifestation and others in farms is under operation since 1996 \(^8\). Between 1996 and 2001, 2,247 heads of cattle were tested, and the first BSE-positive case was discovered in September 2001 \(^8\).

Subsequently, test objects and number of cattle expanded sequentially, and as a general rule, dead cattle that are 24 months or older have been included in test objects since April 2003 \(^8\). Accordingly, blanket testing of dead cattle aged 24 months or older began in April 2004 \(^8\).

The ELISA is performed as a primary test at livestock hygiene service centers, and positive samples are tested using the WB method and the IHC method at the National Institute of Animal Health \(^8\). A final diagnosis is made by expert members at the technical research meeting of the risk management organization \(^8\).

By the end of September 2005, 202,398 high-risk cattle (those with central nervous system manifestation and dead cattle aged 24 months or older) were tested by the ELISA, and 4 positive cases were detected by the IHC and WB methods. In addition, 788 suspected cases were tested using the ELISA by 2005 (by the time when the 20th case of BSE-positive in Japan was discovered), but no positive cases were detected.
In October 2001, BSE screening tests of all slaughtered cattle in slaughterhouses began in order to prevent use of BSE-positive animals in food. Primary test is performed by the ELISA, then confirmatory test by the WB method, pathological tests, the IHC method. In BSE testing of slaughtered cattle of all ages, the ELISA is performed as primary test at 114 meat inspection stations throughout Japan (this year’s plan), and positive cases are subjected to secondary test at 3 confirmatory testing laboratories in Japan by the WB method (National Institute of Infectious Diseases and Hokkaido University) and by pathological tests and the IHC method (National Institute of Infectious Diseases and Obihiro University of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine). By October 31, 2005, 4,974,937 heads of cattle were tested, of which 15 were diagnosed BSE-positive in “the Expert Committee of BSE Diagnosis” of the MHLW. The results of this screening test at slaughterhouses are also useful as surveillance data to comprehend the status of BSE contamination correctly.

Apparently, improvement of surveillance by adding subject animals, number of subject animals, and test methods, will enable detection of more BSE-positive cattle in many countries, besides in the United States and Canada.

**Consideration of the testing techniques**

1) **Sampling**
   Most BSE incidents are sporadic, and unlike other infectious diseases, it is difficult to estimate the extent of contamination by random testing. Among the 20 BSE-positive animals detected in Japan, only four (except for the first case) were detected by the testing of dead animal that fell into high-risk cattle. Indeed, these four were detected around the same time when blanket testing of dead cattle aged 24 months or older was initiated, or later. The extent of BSE contamination in Japan has finally become estimable based on the results of the 4-year blanket testing in slaughterhouses and the 1.5-year blanket testing of dead cattle that are 24 months or older. This indicates the limitation of sampling of only high-risk cattle in the BSE testing that the OIE proposes. The indication must be noted when the results of the surveillance in the United States and Canada, conducted only by random testing of high-risk cattle, are examined to comprehend the current status of BSE contamination.

2) **Collecting materials**
   In Japan, the medulla oblongata is divided into two by a sagittal section, and one is used for biochemical tests by the ELISA and the WB method, and the other is used for pathological tests and the IHC method. The standard operation procedure Appendix 1 of the NVSL only indicates the obex of the medulla oblongata, an examination site, does not specify a sampling method that considers confirmatory test.

3) **Primary test**
   The BIO-RAD’s ELISA kit is used for the primary test in the United States. In Canada, the BIO-RAD’s and Prionics’ kits are used in the primary test. All these kits are assessed and approved by the EU. In Japan, BIO-RAD’s, Enfer’s, and Fujirebio’s kits are used, which have the similar...
sensitivities as those used in the United States and Canada.

4) Confirmatory test

a) The WB method
In the United States and Canada, the WB method described in the OIE Manual of Standards (SAF Immunoblot) is used. A separation and refinement method based on Diringer’s papers in 1995 and 1997 is described in the manual as an example. This method is designed to separate and refine SAF by combining detergent treatment, ultracentrifugation, and PK treatment, and the efficiency of separation and refinement in every test, i.e., SAF detection sensitivity measured at each confirmatory testing laboratory, must be specified.

In Japan, the WB method is performed using the remaining sample of the primary test (350 µg) and samples that are newly obtained from the obex. A lot-controlled mouse scrapie sample is used as a positive control. Detection sensitivities of each blot are ensured by comparison with the detection limit of this positive control.

b) Immunohistochemical test (IHC method)
The IHC method was the only one test method in the United States from 1993 to the end of May 2005. The testing protocol of the IHC method is specified in the NVSL SOP GPPISOP 0032.03; unlike the OIE protocol, formic acid treatment is not performed and thus it influences the biosafety of laboratory workers. Verification of antibodies used in the United States is required, as their potential effects on detection sensitivity cannot be ruled out. The IHC method used in the confirmatory test, reported by Canada, follows the method in the OIE manual, and thus there is no need to consider the reduction in detection sensitivity, including that of image data.

5) Expert committee for diagnosis
In Japan, cases that underwent the confirmatory test, whether positive or negative, are judged by the Expert Committee based on the results of the ELISA, WB, and IHC methods. Judgment is based on comprehensive assessment of test results. It is said that the U.S. Expert Committee members consist of pathologists probably because the IHC method was the only confirmatory test, but the members are not disclosed. The WB method is scheduled for introduction to the confirmatory test in June 2005, and thus, participation of other experts who are not involved in the testing as members should be requested to assess the results of the ELISA, WB, and IHC methods comprehensively.

The positive cases in the primary inspection in Canada are examined by several BSE diagnosis kits assessed by the EU Committee (including kits that are not approved in Japan), in addition to the confirmatory test by the IHC method, for comprehensive assessment and judgment. The authority and responsibility associated with the BSE diagnosis are imposed on the professional views of the National BSE Laboratory, and ultimately on the representative of this laboratory.

Extrapolation from the surveillance data in the United States/Canada and Japan
According to the BSE testing data in Japan and the data of the expanded surveillance in the United States
and Canada, the detection rates are 0.0028% in Japan (2004), 0.00026% in the United States (June 2004 to June 21, 2005), and 0.0038% in Canada (June 1, 2004 to June 21, 2005) 87). The total number of cattle farmed is approximately 95 million and 4.5 million in the United States and Japan, respectively 21). Among them, the numbers of adult animals (as for cows, in general, “adults” indicate delivered cows, while young cows do heifers) are reported to be approximately 42 million in the United States (beef cattle: approximately 33 million, dairy cows: approximately 9 million), and approximately 1.92 million in Japan (beef cattle: approximately 0.77 million, dairy cows: approximately 1.15 million) 88). The annual numbers of cattle that die in farms and those disposed of at slaughterhouses are approximately 0.94 million and 0.19 million in the United States, and approximately 98,100 and 8,300 in Japan (downers aged 24 months or older), respectively 88). In addition, the annual number of cattle slaughtered is approximately 33.5 million and 1.26 million in the United States and Japan, respectively 88).

According to the BSE testing data in 2003, the number of healthy slaughtered cattle tested in Japan is approximately 1.26 million (adult animals: 0.9 million), of which 2 BSE-positive cases were discovered, while no BSE-positive case was discovered among healthy slaughtered cattle in the United States, since only few tests are conducted on healthy slaughtered cattle in the surveillance. With regard to cattle that died in farms or were disposed of at slaughterhouses, approximately 0.11 million were tested in Japan, of which 3 BSE-positive cases were discovered, while the number of the tested animals in the United States was 0.39 million, which accounted for 35% of the total, and one BSE-positive case was discovered 88). Thus, 3 BSE-positive cases (1×100/35) are estimated to be discovered in all the cattle that die in farms or are disposed of at slaughterhouses (1.13 million). The positive ratio between healthy slaughtered adult cattle and those that die in farms or are disposed of at slaughterhouses is 1 (2/0.9 million):12.3 (3/0.11 million) in Japan. When this ratio is extrapolated to the data of the United States, the number of BSE-positive cattle is estimated to be one discovered in 2.7 million healthy slaughtered adult cattle (3/1.13 million×2.70 million×1/12.3). Assuming the same contamination rate in young animals, 1 or 2 BSE-positive cases will be discovered annually in Japan, and 32 BSE-positive cases in the United States.

In Canada, according to the results of the expanded surveillance that has been implemented until present (June 1, 2004 to June 21, 2005), 2 BSE-positive cows were discovered, and the detection rate was 0.0038%. The tested cattle (52,817) accounted for approximately 66% of the total high risk object cattle in the surveillance (approximately 80,000) 97). Three BSE-positive cows (all of them were downer) have been discovered to date. If the same extrapolation is conducted in Canada, as conducted in the United States, the number of BSE-positive cattle is estimated to be 2 in 53,000 high-risk cattle, and 3 if all the 80,000 animals are tested. Assuming that healthy slaughtered adult cattle account for 20% of all the slaughtered cattle (0.9 million) and the positive rate of 12.3 between healthy cattle and high-risk cattle is extrapolated, 3 BSE-positive cases will be discovered in 0.9 million heads of cattle (3/80,000×0.9 million×1/12.3). If the same contamination rate is applied to young cattle, 22 BSE-positive cases will be discovered annually in 3.6 million cattle (6×3.6 million/0.98 million).
The presented figures are based on the limited data; therefore, there is a risk of overestimating the influence. In Japan, 6 to 7 BSE-positive animals are discovered annually, while approximately 5 to 6-fold and 4 to 5-fold BSE-positive cattle are estimated in the United States and Canada, respectively. Considering the BSE contamination rate adjusted by population, annual BSE-positive animals per one million are estimated to be 5 to 6 in Japan, approximately 1 in the United States, and 5 to 6 in Canada. However, as described in the section “Assessment and Comparison of Inspection Techniques”, the size and system of BSE inspection differ markedly between Japan and the United States/Canada. Thus, this difference must be considered when using this extrapolated data.

Table 3. Verification by BSE Inspection Data (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Supplements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of farmed cattle</td>
<td>95 million</td>
<td>15 million</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult cattle</td>
<td>42 million</td>
<td>9 million</td>
<td>2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cattle slaughtered annually</td>
<td>0.19 million (0.57%)</td>
<td>4.3 million</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cattle disposed of in slaughterhouses (sick or abnormal cattle)</td>
<td>0.5 million (1.5%)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>8,300 (0.66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cattle died in farms</td>
<td>0.44 million (4.8%)</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
<td>Beef cattle : 11,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection data</td>
<td>3.3 million</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy slaughtered cattle</td>
<td>No inspection</td>
<td>No inspection</td>
<td>2 cattle in 1.26 million (9 cattle in 4.4 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy adult cattle: high-risk cattle</td>
<td>0.9 million : 80,000 (approx. 1:3)</td>
<td>2 cattle in 1.26 million (9 cattle in 4.4 million) (0.8 million of cattle that are 30-month-old or older)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-risk cattle</td>
<td>Approx. 1 in 0.39 million cattle (25% inspected) (approx. 1:3)</td>
<td>0.9 million : 80,000</td>
<td>The positive rate of high-risk cattle is 12.3-fold higher than that of healthy adult cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The possibility of detection in adult cattle (cattle that are 30-month-old or older in total)</td>
<td>4 cattle / 3.8 million</td>
<td>2 positive cattle in 53,000 (approx. 1:3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks in young cattle (infected below the detection limit)</td>
<td>36 cattle / year</td>
<td>About 3 cattle / year</td>
<td>5 cattle / 1 million (excluding young cattle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4 Summary of risks of live cattle

(1) When the absolute values of BSE external challenge in Japan, the United States, and Canada are compared, the risks arising from imported live cattle are estimated to be 1.5 to 7-fold in the United States and 4 to 6-fold in Canada, and the risks arising from imported MBM and animal oil and fat are estimated to be ≤1/12 to 1/47 in the United States and ≤1/5,100 in Canada, compared with those in Japan. (2) In terms of internal challenge of BSE, the feed regulations seem to have inhibitory effects
on BSE amplification; however, considering the use of SRMs in the United States and Canada and their incomplete prevention of cross-contamination from feed, exposure risks in the United States and Canada are considered higher than those in Japan. Taking these facts into account, an optimistic view is that the contamination risks in the United States and Canada are comparable with those in Japan, and a pessimistic view is that the risks could be approximately 10 (7×1.5)-fold higher than those in Japan. (3) BSE testing in the United States and Canada utilizes the data from limited bovine population, and BSE test-positive cases might have been overlooked due to problems in the test techniques and others. Proper assessment is difficult due to limited data collected from the surveillance, but when the absolute numbers extrapolated from this data are compared, the risks are estimated to be 5 to 6-fold and 4 to 5-fold higher in the United States and Canada than those in Japan, respectively. Considering the approximately 20-times larger breeding scale and approximately 30-times larger slaughtering scale in the United States and approximately 3-times larger breeding and slaughtering scale in Canada than those in Japan, comparison of BSE contamination rates suggest the possibility that the number of BSE-contaminated animals per million head in Japan is comparable to that in Canada, and is slightly less than that in the United States. (4) In the future risk assessment, continuous improvements of the surveillance in the United States and Canada in subjects, headcounts, and test methods are considered important. In addition, surveillance data of the United States and Canada should be comprehended constantly by the Japanese risk management organization, and it is possible that the risks are reassessed based on the data.

3 Risk assessment --beef and internal organs (contamination rates and levels)
To assess the risks of cattle aged 20 months or younger in the risk assessment of live cattle in the United States and Canada, cattle of all ages were analyzed as a background. In terms of the risks of beef and others, risks of beef derived from animals aged 20 months or younger in the United States and Canada are compared with those derived from cattle of all ages in Japan for assessment.

3.1 Comparison of slaughtered cattle
Traceability (confirmation of age)
The subject cattle to be assessed are those of all ages in Japan, and those aged 20 months or younger that are to be confirmed by the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, in the United States and Canada.

In the United States, cattle are divided into those aged 30 months or older and those under 30 months based on the tooth alignment check after slaughtering. In addition, cattle aged 20 months or younger are classified by their birth certificates or A40 grading of their carcasses. Birth certificates enable individual recognition from slaughterhouses to feedlots, but trace back of all animals from feedlots to breeding facilities, via rearing facilities, is difficult since ear-tagging is not compulsory. However, use of ear-tagging is rapidly growing in breeding facilities, and it has been reported that birth certificates are being issued by recording the birth date when the first calf of the year is confirmed in a herd of a breeding facility.
The A40 analysis data report\(^9\) of approximately 4,500 head of cattle (3,338 were used as samples of which ages were traceable) in November 2004 was as follows: (1) Carcasses of all the 21-months-old animals (237) were A50 grade or higher; thus, no carcass with A40 grade or lower was included. (2) Carcasses of 18 to 21-months-old animals (1,748) were A50 grade or higher; thus, no carcass with A40 grade or lower was included. (3) Based on these data, the probability that carcasses of animals aged 21 months or older are A40 grade or lower is 1.92% or below with 99% reliability (additional data (439 samples) reduced the probability to 0.95% or below with 99% reliability\(^{91}\)).

In the United States, 25.1 million young animals account for approximately 90% of cattle slaughtered annually; thus, when 10% of them are A40 in the carcass grading, the total number is approximately 2.51 million. In case cattle aged 21 months or older are included, the total number is approximately 48,000 to 24,000 head/year or below. Assuming that 1 out of 1 million young cattle is contaminated, the probability that one BSE-positive animal is included in this group is estimated to be less than once in 20 times at most (once or less in approximately 20 years; once in 40 years according to a tracing report).

In Canada, a bovine individual recognition program, designed for the investigation of livestock disease and food safety issues, has been implemented since January 2001, and participation in this program has been made compulsory since July 1, 2002. At this point, registration of birth dates is not made compulsory, but farm producers will be able to enter them voluntarily after March 2005\(^{92}-^{95}\). Thus, individual recognition is feasible in Canada, but the age confirmation system can only be applied partly to cattle aged 20 months or younger.

In Japan, a system that ensures traceability of production stages has been implemented since December 2003, and ages of all slaughtered animals can be confirmed\(^{96}\).

**Head-count of slaughtered cattle (age and breed)**

In the United States, approximately 90% of beef cattle that are slaughtered annually (approx. 25.1 million) [approx. 24.3 million head of beef cattle out of approx. 27 million slaughtered annually (approx. 16.5 million steers + approx. 10.5 million non-delivered cattle including approx. 4 million dairy breeds) + 0.8 million calves]] are reported to be 20 months or younger\(^{97}-^{98}\). As of 2005, animals that are judged by birth certificates account for approximately 10% or 25% of those slaughtered annually at present; however, according to some reports, the number is growing rapidly with export to Japan in mind\(^{58}-^{99}\). In addition, animals with A40 grade are reported to account for approximately 10% of cattle slaughtered annually at present\(^{99}\). In Canada, most of the 4.3 million head of cattle slaughtered annually are aged 20 months or younger\(^{21}\)\(^{100}\).

In Japan, approximately 1.3 million heads (all ages) are slaughtered annually: beef breeds include approximately 0.24 million young animals (Japanese steers) and approximately 0.22 million delivered cows (female Japanese cows); dairy breeds include approximately 0.42 million young cattle (dairy
fattened bulls) and approximately 0.35 million delivered cows (dairy cows) 101).

Considering the epidemiological data in Britain, BSE testing data in Japan (all of the 20 BSE-positive cases were Holstein-Friesian dairy cows, including 18 delivered dairy cows and 2 fattened steers 102)), and differences in risks due to different farming manner after birth such as artificial breast-feeding, risks of beef breeds and young cattle are considered relatively lower than those of dairy breeds and delivered cows, respectively.

3.2 Comparison of each slaughtering process

Inspection before slaughtering (exclusion of high-risk cattle)

In the United States and Canada, visual inspection on the gait of all the cattle delivered to a slaughterhouse is conducted by veterinary officers or by meat inspectors under supervision of veterinary officers. Animals with central nervous system manifestation, dead and downer animals, that are detected in the inspection before slaughtering, are banned from use in food. High-risk cattle are excluded from meat production lines, and BSE inspection is implemented mainly on them in the expanded surveillance 103)-105). The high-risk cattle excluded from use in food enter rendering.

In large-scale slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada, approximately 5,000 head of cattle are inspected daily in a series of process 58) 106) 107). Two inspectors work on shift, thus one inspector examines approximately 2,500 animals. Assuming that 300 animals are inspected per hour, one inspector works for approximately 8 hours. In other words, approximately 12 seconds are spent to inspect each animal before slaughtering.

In Japanese berthing facilities in slaughterhouses, a veterinarian conducts a visual inspection. In the largest slaughterhouse in Japan, a maximum of approximately 400 heads of cattle are inspected daily in 3 lines 104). Two lines have a capacity of inspecting a maximum of 175 per line and 150 are inspected in the other line. At present, the two lines with the capacity of inspecting 175 per line are constantly running at full capacity, and 50 to 150 are inspected in the other line with the capacity of inspecting 150 animals. One veterinarian is assigned to each line. Since the inspection is conducted for 4 hours in the morning, it takes approximately 80 seconds to inspect each animal before slaughtering. Due to the difference in duration of time for visual inspection, the possibility of overlooking abnormal animals in large-scale slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada cannot be denied. Considering the higher BSE positive rate among high-risk cattle compared with that in healthy slaughtered cattle, proper inspection before slaughtering is required.

On the other hand, in the United States and Canada, downer animals are excluded from use in food by the present inspection before slaughtering, thus the possibility of the scenario that BSE-positive cases with neurological abnormalities aged 20 months or younger that are subjects of the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, are overlooked in the inspection before slaughtering is considered extremely low (See BSE epidemiological data in Britain: at the time of high-level contamination, one 20-months-old BSE
animal was discovered among 0.18 million BSE cattle. 

**BSE inspection in slaughterhouses (screening)**

In Japan, the first BSE cow was discovered in September 2001, and BSE testing on slaughtered cattle of all ages began in October 2001 to exclude BSE-positive animals from use in meat. Subsequently, since August 2005, the subject of mandatory BSE screening tests has changed from cattle of all ages to those aged 21 months or older. Optional BSE screening tests of cattle of all ages are performed on a voluntary basis as of October 2005. In the United States, screening tests are not conducted at slaughterhouses, and only few slaughtered healthy cattle aged 30 months or older are tested for surveillance (34 animals as of July 25, 2005).

In the United States and Canada, BSE screening tests are not virtually conducted on healthy slaughtered cattle, and thus risk avoidance by screening test is impossible.

**Stunning method**

Stunning is used in the United States, Canada, and Japan. In most slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada, penetrating captive bolt stun guns are used, of which compressed-air stun guns that use air injection have been prohibited in the United States since January 2004, and in Canada since 2000, because they might cause contamination of visible brain pieces, called giant emboli, into the circulatory system of a stunned animal.

According to the surveillance of 160 facilities conducted in Japan at the end of October 2004, the stunning methods were as follows: Stun guns (slaughter guns) were used in 149 slaughterhouses, and the tip of the bolt enters the cranial cavity. In one of these facilities, air guns that give air shocks but do not penetrate into the cranial cavity were used. In addition, slaughter hammers were used in 30 slaughterhouses, and stun guns were jointly used in 19 facilities among them. Methods that use compressed-air or gas injection into the cranial cavity were not used in any slaughterhouses.

**Pithing**

In Japan, as of December 2004, approximately 80% of slaughtered cattle undergo pithing, while pithing is prohibited by the Humane Slaughter Act in the United States, and by the Meat Inspection Law in Canada. In Japan, to prohibit pithing, slaughterhouses where pithing was prohibited were publicized (April 2005), and in addition, improvement of facilities toward the ban on pithing in slaughterhouses is promoted today.

Risks posed by pithing can be ignored in the United States and Canada. In Japan, 80% of slaughtered animals undergo pithing, thus the contamination risks of central nervous tissue, posed by pithing, are considered higher than those in the United States and Canada.
SRM removal (spinal cord removal and tests on dressed carcasses after washing)

SRMs are removed from all slaughtered cattle in Japan.

According to the domestic regulations in the United States and Canada, SRMs that should be removed from all ages of cattle include the tonsils (cattle aged 30 months or older in Canada) and the small intestine (only the distal ileum after October 2005), while the spinal cord, brain, eyeballs, and vertebral column are removed only from cattle aged 30 months or older\(^{57}114\).

Based on the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, SRMs are removed from all cattle exported to Japan\(^{19}20\). SRM removal is visually examined by meat inspectors (veterinarians) in Japan and meat inspectors (including veterinarians) in the United States and Canada\(^{114}-116\).

In Japan, immediately after the BSE occurrence in September 2001, a technique of removing the spinal cord after split liner and washing was used due to the unavailability of equipment that absorb the spinal cord. Absence of residual spinal cord tissue in the vertebral column is visually inspected in all animals by meat inspectors. To introduce this technique, its effectiveness in removing the spinal cord is demonstrated by the test using glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) as a marker by the research group of the MHLW\(^{117}\). Subsequently, a suction method to remove the spinal cord before split liner has become widely used, and is used by 91.9% of slaughterhouses today (as of January 2005)\(^{111}\). Removal of spinal cords in these cattle is confirmed by the above meat inspectors.

In the United States, removal of the spinal cord in cattle aged 30 months or older has been made compulsory by regulations, and according to the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, after removing the spinal cord from all cattle and washing carcasses, removal is confirmed by meat inspectors. In major packers, the spinal cord is removed after split liner by 2 or 3 workers using a suction machine, and carcasses are washed 5 or 6 times with warm or cold water. Absence of residual spinal cord in the vertebral column is visually inspected by inspectors and the workers\(^{58}116\). The effectiveness of this technique to remove the spinal cord has not been scientifically demonstrated by the test using GFAP as a marker.

Management based on SSOP and HACCP (Inspection of compliance)

In Japan, procedures are documented as SSOP (Sanitation Standard Operating Procedures), and operation records are preserved\(^{118}\), thus the management by HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) has not been made compulsory. As of March 2005, SSOP was prepared in all the slaughterhouses that had been inspected until then. In the United States and Canada, procedures are documented in SSOP and HACCP, and operation records are preserved\(^{89}119\).

In Japan, as a result of the domestic revision, inspection of the compliance with SSOP for hygienic management, including SRM removal, has been increased to twice a year\(^{120}\). However, inspections of SRM removal and others as well as the results have not been publicized to date.
The United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) published that 1,036 violations of the SRM removal regulation, which has been made compulsory for meat process manufacturers, were confirmed between January 2004 and May 2005 \(^{121}\). In the case of violation, the authority examines safe conditions and orders the violators to take remedial action. The confirmation of the 1,036 violations indicates “the inspectors determined that regulations were not strictly put into practice, and thus immediately took remedial action.”

The 1,036 cases of violations included (1) 405 cases associated with the HACCP plan, such as unstored certificates of age in months and SRM removal, and defects in the plan, (2) 467 cases associated with handling of SRMs, such as improper washing of knives and saws, improper removal of spinal cords and tonsils, and improper hand-washing, and (3) 164 cases associated with record storage, such as defects in SSOP and HACCP implementation records, SRM removal and SRM removal training records, and confirmation record of age in months. After remedial actions were taken for these nonconforming cases, the actions were confirmed and the operation of 6 facilities was halted.

3.3 Comparison of risks of meats and others

Distribution of BSE prion in the live body

To assess BSE risks of meat, distribution of BSE prion in BSE-positive cattle must be considered. At the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Britain, distribution of BSE prion in the living body was examined by bioassay using tissues of experimentally-infected bovine animals \(^{122}\) \(^{123}\). The bovine animals that were inoculated intracerebrally with the muscle emulsion of the other bovine animals that were killed at 6, 18, 26, and 32 months after oral administration did not develop BSE-like symptoms by 71, 99, 71, and 98 months after inoculation, respectively. Meanwhile, the animals that were inoculated intracerebrally with the distal ileum emulsion of the other bovine animals that were killed at 6, 10, and 18 months after oral administration developed the symptoms after an average 27, 22, and 24 months of incubation periods, respectively. Moreover, 1 of 5 animals that were inoculated intracerebrally with the palatine tonsil emulsion of the other animals killed at 10 months after oral administration developed symptoms after 45 months of incubation period \(^{122}\) \(^{123}\).

In terminally-ill animals with BSE symptoms and the BSE-positive animals (94 months old) detected in high-risk cattle, BSE prion were also detected in areas other than specified risk materials \(^{124}\) \(^{125}\), thus the presence of BSE prion in the muscle (branch of a nerve) cannot be denied. Although the data obtained from the ongoing experiment is limited, BSE prion has not been detected from the muscle of experimentally-infected animals during the incubation period in a bioassay using bovine animals, up until the present. To obtain correct data, the results, including those from infection experiments conducted in Japan, must be observed closely and scrutinized in the future. In Britain and Germany, a large-scale sampling experiment is also underway.

In 1992, at the peak of BSE occurrence, BSE animal, as young as 20-months-old, was discovered in Britain. The incubation period has been prolonged along with a decreased contamination level; thus, the
youngest BSE animals were 49-months-old in 2004, and 38-months-old in 2005. Thus, to study the age and prion distribution in the living bodies of BSE-positive cattle, BSE contamination levels in the area must also be considered.

**Meat and Advanced Meat Recovery (AMR)**
The percentages of cattle aged 30 months or older in major packers in the United States and Canada vary with facilities, but it ranges from <1% to about 10% [58]. Cattle aged 30 months or older are stored in other lines in a refrigerator, and strict measures to prevent mix-up with other cattle aged 30 months or younger are taken, such as attaching a blue tape on the shoulder and thigh, and applying blue edible ink to the vertebral column, for quick distinction. Furthermore, they are scrapped and processed in other lines, or, on the final day of the week to prevent mix-up of meat and bone pieces [58].

The present Beef Export Verification Program for Japan states that measures to prevent mix-up of beef and others, derived from cattle aged 21 months or older and 20 months or younger will be implemented. Accordingly, products must be identified by packages such as by indicating separate lines, washing; as with beef and others, measures must be taken for easy distinction from other carcasses and beef products, when carrying out carcasses from the facility.

In Japan, there are no special measures by age of months at present.

AMR is a method to collect the remaining pieces of meat from the carcasses bones after meat is removed, without crushing bones, by blowing high-pressured water or air to the bones of carcasses. Because of the risks of SRM contamination, regulations concerning AMR have been tightened in the United States and Canada, as exemplified by a ban on use of AMR for the skulls and vertebral columns of cattle aged 30 months or older [57]. Meat obtained by AMR is not a subject of the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan.

**Internal organs**
In terms of bovine internal organs, there is a record of export to Japan of tongues, from which the tonsils were removed, and intestinal tracts, stomachs, livers, bladders, and others, from which the distal ileums were removed [126].

The risks of the small intestine other than the distal ileum are considered to be risks posed by BSE prion accumulation and SRM contamination. In terms of findings associated with the infectivity of the small intestine other than the distal ileum, experimental results in Britain and Japan are available: (1) In the infection experiment conducted in Britain, no infectivity in the small intestine other than the distal ileum was demonstrated at 6 months after oral administration of the brain of a BSE infected bovine cattle [127], and (2) as a result of investigation on the accumulation of BSE prion protein in each tissue of 3 BSE-positive animals discovered in Japan, BSE prion protein accumulation was found in the distal ileum of two animals by using the WB method, and one by the IHC method, but none in the small intestine other
than the distal ileum 128).

In association with the above results, FSIS announced a draft revision of the interim final regulations concerning “bovine internal organs used in food and cosmetics” (implemented on October 7, 2005; opinions are called for until November 7, 2005), which approved the use of the small intestine, from which the distal ileum has been removed, in food and cosmetics 129. The risks of SRM contamination are the same as those of meat; risk avoidance is considered possible by properly removing SRMs such as the spinal cord and distal ileum to prevent contamination of SRMs to other tissues.

In addition, risks of the tongues are posed by attachment and contamination of tonsil tissue, thus in the United States and Canada, risk avoidance is thoroughly pursued by publishing a manual (SSOP) with photographs of points to remember in cutting out the tongue 119,130.

Meanwhile, since age determination by A40 grading is conducted using carcasses after refrigeration, during which mix-up with internal organs without A40 grade might occur, unless they are identified corresponding to the carcasses, internal organs cannot be exported to Japan only with age determination by A40 grading, but internal organs that can be managed with identification corresponding to their carcasses can be exported to Japan.

3.4 Summary of contamination risks of beef and internal organs
In terms of risks of beef and others, comparison between the risks of beef derived from cattle aged 20 months or younger in the United States/Canada and risks of beef derived from cattle of all ages in Japan shows that (1) the certification of age in months is not streamlined in the United States and Canada, unlike in Japan. In particular, A40 judgment might not completely exclude 21 months or older cattle. However, considering the background risks of live cattle, the probability that BSE-contaminated cattle are included in this group is thought to be very low. (2) In terms of exclusion of abnormal animals by the tests before slaughter, we cannot deny that a risk of overlooking abnormal animals in large-scale slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada may be higher than that in Japan. However, the probability of the following scenario is considered very low: the subjects of the present Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, i.e., BSE-positive cattle with nerve abnormalities aged 20 months or younger, are overlooked in the tests before slaughter. (3) Since BSE screening tests for healthy slaughtered cattle are virtually not conducted in the United States and Canada, risk avoidance by tests is impossible. However, the probability of finding BSE-positive cases among the subjects of the present Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, i.e., cattle aged 20 months or younger, by the BSE inspection is considered very low. (4) In terms of the slaughtering process, the risk management measures by stunning, SRM removal, and procedures (SSOP and HACCP) differ slightly between Japan and the United States/Canada; however, when each measure is not properly practiced, risk avoidance by these measures becomes incomparable between Japan and the United States/Canada. (5) Pithing is banned by the law in the United States and Canada whereas in Japan, approximately 80% cattle undergo pithing and thus are high at risks. (6) As for the compliance with regulations, in the United States, cases of
violations are inspected, corrected by remedial actions, and published. On the other hand, neither an inspection nor a report of a similar kind is present in Japan. (7) In terms of beef and others, as long as the conditions of the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan ((i) SRM removal in cattle of all ages, (ii) certificate for beef and others of cattle aged 20 months or younger, and (iii) separate management of products for Japan from that of other products, such as a separate treatment line, washing, identification, packaging, and labeling of products) are observed, the probability of BSE prion contamination is considered very low. Internal organs cannot be exported only with an identification of A40 age in months, and can only be exported when managed and identified with corresponding dressed carcasses.

### 4 For conclusion

The objects of the risk assessment in the present consultation included beef and internal organs for food (tongues and major internal organs excluding SRMs and beef), but processed products were not included. The assessment was conducted on the assumption that the risk management organization takes the responsibility of the compliance with the Beef Export Verification Program.

(1) When the risks of beef and internal organs, subjects compared in the present consultation, are considered, Japanese cattle are those of all ages that are slaughtered at slaughterhouses, including those born before 2001 (aged 4-year-old or older) when feed regulations were not implemented thoroughly (complete feed regulation). As of 2005, 5 or 6 BSE-positive cases are detected annually. Other risks are infected animals below the detection limit. Thus, the contamination level is the sum of level of each year, and the subjects are cattle delivered to slaughterhouses. On the other hand, the subject populations in the United States and Canada are cattle aged 20 months or younger: those that are born after February 2004. Thus, the risk assessment indicates the contamination level as of February 2004.

(2) When background risks are considered, the rates of BSE contamination in Japan and Canada are comparable (5 to 6 animals/million). According to the surveillance data in the United States, approximately 1 animal/million of BSE contamination and approximately 2 to 3 animals/million of external challenge are estimated [5 to 6 animals in Japan × approx. 10-fold ÷ 20 (feeding scale)].

### Table 4 Risk Levels in Live Cattle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects of risk assessment</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of subject slaughtered cattle (p.a.)</td>
<td>20-months-old or younger</td>
<td>20-months-old or younger</td>
<td>All ages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of BSE-positive cattle (per million)</td>
<td>2 to 3</td>
<td>5 to 6</td>
<td>5 to 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infection dose</td>
<td>Detection limit-below detection limit</td>
<td>Detection limit-below detection limit</td>
<td>Positive cattle were excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) In the risk assessment of beef and others in the United States and Canada, there was no method but a method to compare the principles of risk reduction measures. When data was available, efforts were made to compare effectiveness as much as possible; however, data was limited in its availability. The Beef Export Verification Program was assessed with an assumption that it was observed, since it is not implemented at present.
### Table 5 Risk Levels of Beef and Internal Organs and Possible Import

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspection before slaughter (exclusion of abnormal cattle)</td>
<td>Approx. 12 seconds per animal</td>
<td>There is a greater risk of overlooking abnormal cattle than in Japan, but the risk of overlooking cattle aged 20 months or younger with BSE symptoms is extremely small since downer cattle are excluded from food.</td>
<td>Approx. 80 seconds per animal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stunning</td>
<td>In use</td>
<td>Comparable level with Japan</td>
<td>In use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pithing</td>
<td>No risk</td>
<td>Higher risk in Japan (Pithing is used in 80% of cattle. Risks are avoided by excluding positive cattle in BSE inspection)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRM removal</td>
<td>Meat inspectors conduct a visual inspection to confirm no residual spinal cord in the spinal column. However, the effectiveness of spinal cord removal has not been demonstrated scientifically.</td>
<td>According to the Beef Export Verification Program, SRMs are due to be removed from cattle of all ages.</td>
<td>Slaughter inspectors conduct a visual inspection to confirm spinal cord removal. To introduce this technique, its effectiveness in removing the spinal cord was confirmed by a test using glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) as a marker by the research group of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMR (Advanced meat recovery)</td>
<td>Import was banned by the Beef Export Verification Program (excluded by the Program)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACCP, SSOP</td>
<td>HACCP and SSOP are implemented. Inspection of the compliance, information disclosure, and improvement of cases of violations.</td>
<td>SSOP is implemented. Effectiveness is measured by a questionnaire survey.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation in age identification</td>
<td>[ Birth certificate ]</td>
<td>[ Birth certificate ]</td>
<td>Approx. 1.3 million cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>10%: approx. 2.5 million cattle [ A40 ]</td>
<td>20%: approx. 0.7 million cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth certificate of 20-months-old</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A40 grading</td>
<td>10%: approx. 2.5 million cattle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal organs</td>
<td>[ Birth certificate ]</td>
<td>[ Birth certificate ]</td>
<td>Approx. 1.3 million cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth certificate of 20-months-old</td>
<td>10%: approx. 2.5 million cattle</td>
<td>20%: approx. 0.7 million cattle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) At present, based on the age identification method, subject cattle of import, which have birth certificates, are estimated to be approximately 5 million and 0.7 million from the United States and Canada, respectively, for meat, and approximately 2.5 million and 0.7 million from the United States and Canada, respectively, for internal organs.

5 Conclusions
The past domestic risk assessment could virtually demonstrate the effectiveness and other aspects of the BSE measures, thus assessments have been conducted based on them. However, since the present consultation was conducted outside Japan, assessment of risks of beef and others in the United States and Canada must be based on the assessment of the principles stated in documents, the some data from risk management organizations, and the supplemental remarks of expert members. Thus, it must be taken into account that there were also unclear aspects. In addition, assessment had to be conducted under the assumption that the Beef Export Verification Program was observed.

Many points remained unclear in the data from the United States and Canada both in quality and in quantity, and assessment had to be conducted with the assumption that the management measures are observed. Thus, we must say that it is difficult to assess scientifically the comparability of the BSE risks in the United States/Canada. On the other hand, assuming that the Beef Export Verification Program presented by the risk management organization (mandatory SRM removal in all cattle, export limitation of age to 20 months or younger, etc.) is observed, the difference in the risk levels of beef and others derived from cattle in the United States/Canada and those in Japan is considered very small.

The risk management organization holds the responsibility to confirm these assumptions, and if the assumptions are not observed, the results of assessment will be different from the ones presented.

If the risk management organization decides to take measures to lift the import ban after consideration of the above-mentioned, the Prion Expert Committee is obliged to receive reports on the effectiveness of the Beef Export Verification Program and the results of assessment of compliance with the Program from the management organization, provided that the assessment was conducted based on the assumptions. Subsequently, the management organization is obliged to report to the public.

6 Supplementary items for conclusion
To respond to the present consultation, two points should be emphasized. Firstly, as described in the history of the consultation, the responsibilities of the risk assessment organization and the risk management organization must be defined. When the risk management organization judges and implements measures according to the present verdict, the organization must be accountable of the results to the public, and must hold the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the Beef Export Verification
Program by the exporting countries in lifting the import ban.

Secondly, to respond to the present consultation, the Prion Expert Committee of the Food Safety Commission compared the differences in the domestic measures in Japan, the United States, and Canada. The consultation demands risk assessment, assuming additional conditions for the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan, and the risk assessment was also assessed, assuming the compliance with the Beef Export Verification Program. Thus, establishment of hardware and software for observance of the Beef Export Verification Program and its inspection are most critical. In case the Beef Export Verification Program is not observed, the assessment results are invalid.

We would like to add the following points that were controversial in the course of the risk assessment:

In terms of SRM removal, the current status of surveillance in slaughterhouses in the United States and Canada is unknown, and the effectiveness of the warranty of good safety by the risk management organization remains uncertain. In particular, contamination of pieces of spinal cord into beef and others can be a risk factor, even in a small amount. In such a case, as for SRM removal, it is unclear whether the risks of beef and others derived from cattle in the United States and Canada are comparable with those in Japan. Thus, the inspection system for spinal cord removal must be reinforced.

To accurately comprehend the BSE contamination status in the United States and Canada, and to implement proper management measures, sufficient surveillance of cattle, including healthy animals, must be expanded and maintained. Even if the management measures become effective to some extent, and the epidemic becomes discontinued and localized, or sporadic, at least continuous surveillance of all high-risk cattle must be maintained.

To prevent BSE exposure and propagation in the United States and Canada, ban on the use of SRMs, which account for 99.4% infectivity of BSE prion, is essential. The use of SRM must be banned not only in feed for cattle but also in feed of other animals, which might cause cross-contamination.

The present risk assessment was conducted under the assumption that the Beef Export Verification Program for Japan was observed. Thus, the management organizations must assure the compliance. The risk management organization must establish a system that assures proper implementation of risk-mitigation measures for beef and internal organs that are exported from the United States/Canada to Japan. An accreditation system of slaughterhouses of beef and others exported to Japan as well as a management system, including periodical official on-the-spot inspection of these facilities, are considered effective.

Even if the risk management organization decides to lift the export ban, import should be suspended when management measures are not properly observed, such as when certificate of the birth age in months is absent, SRMs are improperly removed, and there is a possible mix-up with beef derived from
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